The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission will legalize a system that allows new reactor designs, including small modular reactors (SMRs), to receive regulatory review before an application for approval is submitted. The amended Nuclear Safety Act, approved at the Cabinet meeting on the 12th, will be promulgated on the 19th.
The key is the “pre-review system.” Until now in South Korea, safety reviews were only possible after an application for construction approval or standard design approval had been filed. During the development stage, there was no official channel for consultation with regulators.
In effect, South Korea is late in adopting a system already operated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC).
Before the law was amended, the system had been operating on a temporary basis through memorandums of understanding between the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, the Ministry of Science and ICT, and the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment.
One example was the pre-design review for the Innovative Small Modular Reactor (i-SMR), which ran from October 2023 to February this year. Safety issues in 21 design areas were organized, and phased measures were prepared for resolving gaps where current technical standards were difficult to apply.
The amendment also includes changes to safety regulations for sites handling nuclear material. The obligation to appoint a nuclear material safety manager, which had been operated through administrative guidance, is now explicitly stated in law, and five previously required documents for permit applications will be consolidated into a single “nuclear material safety report.” A new incentive has also been introduced, exempting operators with excellent safety management from annual inspections for that year.
Penalty provisions have also been revised. The previous single upper limit of 30 million won has been divided into five tiers: 30 million won, 20 million won, 16 million won, 9 million won, and 6 million won. This makes the amount of a fine more predictable depending on the severity of the violation.
The implementation schedule differs by item. The pre-review system will take effect first, from November. Exemptions from annual inspections and the penalty provisions will apply from January 1, 2027. The deadline for existing licensed users of nuclear materials to submit safety reports has been set for December 31, 2027.
The focus of this revision is not administrative procedure improvement. It is a move to reset the timeline for South Korea’s SMR industry.
The domestic i-SMR project team aims to complete the standard design by the end of 2025, apply for standard design approval in early 2026, and obtain approval in 2028.
The first module is scheduled for production in 2031, with commercialization targeted for 2035 to 2036. The problem is the timeline of global competitors.
NuScale Power in the United States has already received standard design approval, Russia is operating a floating SMR, and China is preparing commercial operation of its land-based SMR, Linglong One. TerraPower’s sodium-cooled fast reactor model, “Natrium,” completed its construction permit safety evaluation from the NRC in December last year.
The gap is around five years. The pre-review system is seen as the most realistic way to narrow it. If developers can organize safety issues with regulators before applying for standard design approval, the risk of losing time through rejection and reapplication during the main review stage is reduced. The path NuScale followed to standard design approval in the U.S. was made possible by such pre-coordination channels.
Time pressure is even greater when Big Tech demand is taken into account. Google has signed a power purchase agreement with Kairos Power, and Amazon has signed multiple power purchase agreements for SMR development projects.
The situation is driven by data center power demand pulling SMRs forward. If Korean developers enter the market only in the mid-2030s, it will be difficult to secure a place in supply chains that have already solidified.
The revision related to nuclear materials is also significant. Explicitly placing the obligation to appoint a safety manager into law creates a legal basis for protecting radiation workers.
Administrative guidance carries limited sanctions even when violated, but legal obligations are different. At the same time, document consolidation and the annual inspection exemption incentive reduce the burden on operators. Safety reinforcement and regulatory rationalization have been combined in one law.
Legalization has generally been welcomed. On the 23rd of last month, when the amendment passed the National Assembly plenary session, South Gyeongsang Province said it welcomed the bill as it has been promoting plans such as building an SMR manufacturing support center and developing innovative manufacturing technologies. It assessed that enabling regulatory review from the design stage would also positively affect efforts to attract SMR investment from domestic and foreign companies.
There are, however, concerns. The question is whether regulatory personnel and infrastructure can keep pace. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission is mobilizing the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), and the SMR Regulatory Research Task Force for the i-SMR standard design approval review, but operating the pre-review system stably will inevitably add to the workload. This becomes even more difficult as non-light-water SMRs with different design characteristics multiply.
The credibility of the review is also an issue. Some of the safety analysis reports submitted by the project team for standard design approval are known to have included tests and verification that were not yet complete. If the materials submitted at the pre-review stage are of low quality, the review itself could become a mere formality.
The gap with overseas cases is also notable. Since its 2008 policy statement on advanced reactors and its long-term vision and strategy for non-light-water reactors, the NRC in the United States has operated pre-review on the basis of a long-term roadmap. In South Korea, the non-light-water SMR regulatory research group only launched this year. That is why, while the system has been introduced, more time is still needed in terms of operational depth.
The real message of this revision is the recognition that SMRs are no longer a future technology in the R&D stage. The very fact that the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission will give priority to launching the pre-review system from November signals that. It is aligned with the schedule for standard design approval review.
From an industrial perspective, the door has opened for the supply chain entry timeline to move faster. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power has invested about 53.4 billion won in TerraPower of the United States, and Hyundai Engineering & Construction is participating with Holtec International in the detailed design of the SMR-160 standard model. At a time when market-entry strategies through global partnerships are accelerating, South Korea’s domestic regulatory infrastructure is being put in place.
From a policy perspective, a change in the role of regulators is being signaled. The trend is shifting from post-review-centered regulation to a pre-consultation and accompanying model. This is similar to the way the United States has driven the industry by combining government-led demonstration projects such as ARDP with NRC pre-review. In South Korea as well, under a private-sector-led commercialization structure such as the proposed i-SMR Holdings, the next task is to determine what position the regulator will occupy.
However, introducing pre-review does not automatically mean shorter licensing times. Even in NuScale’s case in the United States, pre-review did not replace the main review. It merely improved procedural predictability. For Korean SMRs to join the 2030s early commercialization race, the speed and quality of the standard design approval review itself must both be secured.
To narrow the gap, the operational design must be completed before the system takes effect. With the November launch approaching, the points to check are clear.
Expanding regulatory staffing is the top priority. A precise diagnosis is needed to determine whether the current review and assessment capacity of KINS, KINAC, and the task force can handle i-SMR standard design approval and new pre-review applications simultaneously.
It would be worth referring to the NRC’s practice of operating dedicated teams by reactor type during the ARDP process. To prevent a shortage of personnel from reducing pre-review to a formal procedure, budget allocation and the securing of an external expert pool must go hand in hand.
Next is the reorganization of regulatory standards by reactor type. Under its SMR regulatory framework roadmap, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission is sequentially launching regulatory research groups this year for non-light-water SMRs such as sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and molten salt reactors.
For pre-review to function meaningfully, safety assessment methodologies and technical standards must be organized in advance for each reactor type. If the standards themselves must be created during the review process, the procedure will be delayed.
Linkage with international safeguards is also necessary. According to a report by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, the i-SMR has been undergoing mutual review under the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since September last year. The model calls for activating a consultative body involving the IAEA, regulators, and the project operator during the pre-review stage. Making this channel substantive rather than merely formal will directly affect export competitiveness.
A shift toward performance-based regulation is another follow-up task. For designs such as non-light-water reactors that differ in fuel and cooling method from large light-water reactors, applying existing technical standards is difficult. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission is considering internalizing a direction that allows performance-based descriptions and alternative applications instead of design-based criteria. The operational experience of pre-review should become data for this regulatory paradigm shift.
Finally, operator responsibility must be part of the process. Pre-review is a system that eases regulatory burdens; it is not a system that exempts verification responsibility. The first application in November is expected to become the litmus test for whether a culture takes root in which operators submit verified materials and proactively present solutions to safety issues.